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O VER THE PAST HALF-MILLENNIUM, the relationship between war and law has been the subject of much change. Two issues have remained 
central, even in modern international humanitarian law (IHL): the first is 
"quarter," that is, the obligation to spare the life of a combatant who has laid 
down his arms and surrendered, and, second, the protection of women from the 
ravages of war and, especially, rape. Both issues arose during Henry V's 
Agincourt campaign, a phase of the Hundred Years' War that started in 1415 
with the landing of Henry's Army near Harfleur, the siege and capture of 
Harfleur, and its victory in Agincourt, and ended in 1420 with the conclusion 
of the Treaty of Troyes, which pronounced Henry the heir to the French 
throne. At Agincourt, the terrain, the tactics, and the longbow helped the 
lightly armed and mobile English prevail over the several times larger, heavily 
armoured mounted French knights. The Treaty marked the ascendancy of 
England until Joan of Arc's rallying of the French in 1429 sparked a turning 
point that eventually led to the defeat of England by Charles VII of France. 
This article is based on an inaugural lecture delivered on November 7, 1998, at the 
Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva. 
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This campaign was immortalized in Shakespeare's epic play, on which I shall 
draw. I draw on Shakespeare because his anatomy of war is a close reflection of 
the sixteenth century chronicles, Raphael Holinshed and Edward Hall, and 
thus an excellent vehicle to illustrate the law's evolution. This apt point of de' 
parture in assessing the current state of humanitarian law evidences an ap, 
proach to the issue that may well prove instructive in implementing present 
day IHL. Therefore, it is at Agincourt that the journey to Rome begins. 
Medieval Law of War 
I will start by describing briefly the law of war as it existed during the 
Agincourt campaign. In the Middle Ages, chivalry was the principal normative 
system providing a code of behaviour for knights, nobility, and the entire war, 
ring class in the endemic wars in which they were involved. The humane and 
noble ideals of chivalry included justice, loyalty, courage, honour, and mercy, 
obligations of not killing or otherwise taking advantage of a vanquished enemy, 
and keeping one's word, and duties of protecting the weak, especially women, 
and helping people in distress. Seldom if ever realized in full, chivalry was a mLx 
of reality, poetry, and legend. Despite humanizing warfare, chivalry also con' 
tributed to the legitimization of war and, through ransom and pillage, provided 
economic incentives for resorting to war. 
The rules of chivalry were customary. However, various royal ordinances, 
including Henry V's famous ordinances of war, codified some of these rules, in, 
cluding those protecting women from rape and persons belonging to the 
Church from capture and robbery. In addition, writers on chivalry compiled 
treatises and manuals explaining the rules of chivalry, such as the duties to 
grant quarter on the battlefield in exchange for ransom and to treat prisoners 
humanely. 
Chivalry's norms were fully applicable, regardless of nationality, between 
knights and nobility but did not protect commoners and peasants and were not 
applicable to non, Christians. Gentlemen were careful to avoid surrendering to 
commoners and commoners to gentlemen. Rules were international but were 
not class or religion neutral. They were enforced by courts of chivalry and mili, 
tary courts, but-in contrast to our own-modem system of detailed Hague and 
Geneva conventions-honour and shame played a critical role in enforce, 
ment; the sanction of dishonour for the knight who violated his knightly duties 
was quite effective. Although our generation has lost the sense of shame-con, 
sider the slaughter and rape in Algeria-at least we have gained in universality: 
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all men and women, of whatever class, religion or colour, are entitled to the full 
protection of international humanitarian law. 
Let me situate briefly chivalry in the medieval law of nations. Chivalry was 
the jus annorum, or the law of arms, the special law of the knightly class paral, 
leling such special laws as the law merchant or the law of the sea. It was a part of 
the law of nations, or jus gentium, although the law of nations addressed also ad, 
ditional subjects such as the privileges of ambassadors and the law of treaties. 
Agincourt 
From history, literature, and the films of Laurence Olivier and Kenneth 
Branagh, most know the story of Agincourt, one of the rare great medieval bat, 
tles during a period when wars were won or lost mostly by besieging fortresses 
and cities. The massacre of the French prisoners of war in Agincourt, the flower 
of French nobility and chivalry, is comprehensible only if we consider how out, 
numbered the English forces were and how great their fear must have been. As 
the battle wore on, the outnumbered English appeared to have the upper hand. 
The fear that another French charge was about to begin, the presence on the 
battlefield of a very large number of French prisoners who, though disarmed, 
could have risen against their English captors, and the French attack on the 
English rear camp possibly involving loss of life among the young boys guarding 
the camp, all combined to trigger an unexpected order by the King. Shake, 
speare's Henry cries out: 
But hark, what new alarm is this same? 
The French have reinforced their scattered men. 
Then every soldier kill his prisoners. 
But Shakespeare's Gower then responds to Fluellen's comment that it was 
against the law of arms to kill the boys and explains the King's order as gener, 
ated by the pillage of his treasures from the rear camp. He sarcastically adds 
that the King ordered cutting the throat of prisoners, "O'tis a gallant king." 
Shakespeare thus explains Henry's cruel order on two grounds: necessity, as 
the French appeared to be regrouping to attack; and reprisal for the unlawful 
attack on the servants guarding the rear camp and for its plunder. 
The defence of reprisal was doubtful even at the time. The rear camp consti, 
tuted a lawful military objective. It is far from certain that the pages guarding 
the camp were entitled to the immunity of children. At least some medieval ju, 
rists regarded non,combatant servants of an army, even when not involved in 
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any fighting, as legitimate military objectives. What made the massacre even 
more reprehensible, was that it was directed against prisoners. Yet some great 
Renaissance jurists, such as Gentili, still justified reprisals against a collectivity. 
Grotius dissented, "nature does not sanction retaliation except against those 
who have done wrong. It is not sufficient that by a sort of fiction the enemy may 
be conceived as forming a single body." 
If the massacre of the prisoners was not justified as a reprisal, could it have 
been justified on grounds of necessity? It may well be that the heavily outnum~ 
bered English would have had difficulty repelling another attack while guard~ 
ing their numerous prisoners. But this explanation is undercut by the fact that 
the King decided to spare the highest ranking prisoners, whose ransom would 
belong to him. Indeed, captors who were knights refused to carry out the order 
and the King had to use 200 of his archers to carry out the gruesome task of 
throat cutting. 
Nevertheless, the eminent medieval jurist Giovanni da Legnano recognized 
the captor's right to kill prisoners where there was fear of disturbance of the 
peace; even the Renaissance scholar Vitoria prohibited killing of prisoners only 
after victory had been won and all danger was over. Gentili, however, harshly 
criticized the killing. NotWithstanding Gentili's condemnation, it cannot be 
concluded that Henry clearly violated contemporary standards. Killing prison~ 
ers in an emergency was not unprecedented. While quarter was normally 
granted in Anglo~ French wars, the virtual absence of contemporary criticism of 
Henry's action suggests that cruel as it was, his order did not violate the ac~ 
cepted norms of behaviour. 
Even before the treaty of Rome, certainly under the jurisprudence of 
Nuremberg, killing of prisoners of war, whether in the guise of reprisals or on 
grounds of military necessity would be an absolute war crime. Yet, as recently as 
during World War II, reprisal killing of innocent civilians in occupied territo~ 
ries was, in some circumstances, lawful. The Nuremberg tribunals ruled that 
killing of civilian hostages in reprisal for hostile acts against the occupying 
power was not a war crime provided that certain conditions were complied 
with. Today, it would be a war crime under the Geneva Conventions and Pro~ 
tocols, and certainly under the Treaty of Rome with its explicit criminalization 
of refusal to grant quarter. 
But what about the killing of prisoners of war on grounds of necessity in 
modem humanitarian law? Medieval chivalry, medieval ordinances of war and 
humanist writings of Renaissance writers were followed by about two lean cen~ 
turies of humanitarian law. Two major challenges, one military, the other reli~ 
gious, forced a decline of chivalry without providing an effective substitute. 
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Wars fought by large groups using long,range artillery were not conducive to 
the pursuit and taking of prisoners or the once customary grant of quarter in ex, 
change for ransom. And the emergence of Protestantism triggered an increas, 
ing dehumanization of members of an adversary branch of Christianity, and 
thus a fertile environment for the destruction of those regarded as subhuman. 
Remember the massacre of Saint Bartholomew's Day or the outright killing by 
the English of Spanish Armada sailors shipwrecked in Western Ireland. 
By the mid,19th.century, the technology which precipitated the demise of 
chivalry ultimately generated the need for international rules of war to human, 
ize the conduct of hostilities, limit the killing and maiming, and ensure the hu, 
mane care of prisoners, the sick and the wounded. The very scale of casualties 
and of suffering required that this need be recognized. The American Civil 
War generated the Lieber Code promulgated in 1863. The Lieber Code ulti, 
mately spawned that branch of international humanitarian law commonly 
known as the Hague law, which governs the conduct of hostilities. The Battle 
of Solferino, along with Henry Dunant's moving portrayal of the suffering and 
bloodshed at the battle inA Memory ofSolferino (1862) inspired the conclusion 
of the First Geneva Convention (1864) as well as Geneva law more generally, 
the other branch ofIHL which emphasizes the protection of victims of war, the 
sick, the wounded, prisoners, and civilians. Since the mid, 19th Century, we 
have been engaged in a period of intensive multilateral treaty making. 
Both prongs of IHL-Hague and Geneva-drew their guiding principles 
from chivalry. The obligations to use fairness and restraint, mercy and compas, 
sion, in both offensive and defensive situations, have their origin in chivalric 
honour. 
In matters pertinent to military necessity, progress was nevertheless slow. 
Those of us who consider Henry's order in Agincourt to be medieval and bar' 
baric, should note that even the essentially humanitarian Lieber Code allowed 
the denial of quarter to the enemy, that is, Confederate prisoners, on grounds 
of necessity; "A commander is permitted to direct his troops to give no quarter 
... when his own salvation makes it impossible to cumber himself with prison, 
ers." This rule, which was law for the United States Army as recently as 
mid, 19th Century, appears almost designed to legitimate the massacre Henry 
V ordered at Agincourt. 
Compare the modern U.S. Army Field Manual of 1956. It unequivocally 
prohibits killing prisoners on grounds of self, preservation, in whatever 
circumstances. 
However, certain related questions of international humanitarian law are 
less clear, especially whether in all circumstances there is a duty on a military 
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unit to accept surrender and thus, in effect, grant quarter. In the abstract and 
as a general principle, the obligation for a Party to a conflict to accept the sur~ 
render of enemy personnel and thereafter to treat them in accordance with the 
Hague and the Geneva Conventions is categorical. In reality, problems con~ 
tinue to arise. A recent study states that the opinio juris of the United States is 
that quarter may not be refused to an enemy who communicates an offer to sur~ 
render under circumstances permitting that offer to be understood and acted 
upon by U.S. forces. A combatant who appears merely incapable or unwilling 
to fight because he has lost his weapons or is retreating, but who has not com~ 
municated an offer to surrender is still subject to attack. And the 1992 U.S. 
DOD report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War states: 
There is a gap in the law of war in defining precisely when surrender takes effect 
or how it may be accomplished in practical terms. Surrender involves an offer by 
the surrendering party and an ability to accept on the part of his opponent. The 
latter may not refuse an offer of surrender when communicated, but that 
communication must be made at a time when it can be received and properly 
acted upon-an attempt at surrender in the midst of a hard-fought battle is 
neither easily communicated nor received. The issue is one of reasonableness. 
The problem is thus not so much with the concept itself but with the nitty 
gritty of the situational ability of the attacking force to accept surrender. What~ 
ever the black letter of the law, soldiers will not want to risk their own lives in 
granting quarter. Hopefully, the ICRC study o( customary rules ofhumanitar~ 
ian law will be able to advance the proposition that quarter must be given even 
when the safety of the captor is endangered by the presence of the captured 
combatants. But this is an area where a return to a culture of values, and espe~ 
cially honour, is necessary if we want better compliance with the rules. Only 
when it is realized that killing a surrendering enemy is shameful will we see 
progress. 
Protection of Women 
I tum to my second theme, protection of women. License to rape was con~ 
sidered a major incentive for the soldier involved in medieval siege warfare. 
While urging generals to forbid and prevent rape during the sacking of a city, 
Vitoria reluctantly admitted the lawfulness of allowing soldiers to sack a city if 
the "necessities of war" required it or "as a spur to the courage of troops," even 
when this involved rape. These cruel rules were, however, rejected by Gentili. 
Anticipating international criminal tribunals, Gentili wrote that if the enemy 
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who allows rape is not punished by God, he will have to render an account to 
other sovereigns. 
Henry V's ordinances of war prohibited rape and imposed capital punish, 
ment on offenders. Enforcing compliance was a major problem, however. In his 
famous speech at the walls of Harfleur, Shakespeare's Henry enumerates the 
dreadful abuses-including rape, denying quarter, killing non,combatants, , 
children and women-that his troops will commit in the city if it refuses to sur, 
render. How could these dire threats be reconciled with the existing and 
emerging norms protecting women from the ravages of war? The distinction in 
medieval law between the treatment of both combatants and civilians in cap' 
tured territory or on the battlefield, on the one hand, and their treatment in a 
besieged city or fortress that was taken by assault, on the other, suggests an ex, 
planation. Unmitigated brutality was reserved for the population of a city that 
refused to surrender. 
Henry, the commander, tells Harfleur that he will no longer be able to con' 
trol his forces if it does not surrender, and that the leaders of Harfleur will bear 
the responsibility for the resulting brutality. Of course, Shakespeare emphasizes 
rape and its sheer horror. But in a speech which attracted feminist censure, his 
Henry clearly places the responsibility on Harfleur should it resist his ultima' 
tum. In terms of realpolitik, Henry tells Harfleur: "If you do not deal now with 
me, your one protector able only for a time to maintain discipline among this 
terrifying force, the force will run amok according to base human nature and I 
cannot be responsible for the consequences." But such arguments by their very 
nature are likely to incite illegal conduct by the troops, and these claims of the 
inevitable breakdown of discipline are thus both an evasion of the moral re, 
sponsibility that should continue even into battle, and affirmative encourage, 
ment to unrestrained war. 
In modem international law, despite the prohibition of rape in the Lieber 
Code, the protection of women's rights to physical and mental integrity does 
not appear to have been a priority. The Hague Regulations provide only indi, 
rect protection against rape. The 1929 Geneva POW Convention contained a 
general provision too vague to afford effective protection to women prisoners. 
During the Second World War, rape was tolerated and even utilized in some 
instances as an instrument of policy. In occupied Europe and in the occupied 
Far East, tens of thousands of women were subjected to rape and forced to en, 
ter brothels for Nazi and Japanese troops. Rape was not prosecuted in 
Nuremberg, though it was in the Far East. Only in the Fourth Geneva Conven, 
tion of 1949 was an unequivocal prohibition of rape established. Even so, viola, 
tion of this prohibition was not listed among the grave breaches of the 
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Convention which require prosecution or extradition. Finally, it took the mass 
rape in the former Yugoslavia, so well publicized by the media, followed by 
widespread rape in Rwanda, to generate rapid changes. 
International humanitarian law does not develop in a rational and gradual 
way. It develops spasmodically in response to atrocities. It is a pity that calami~ 
tous events are needed to shock the public conscience into focusing on ne~ 
glected areas of the law. The more offensive the occurrence, the greater the 
pressure for rapid adjustment. Nazi atrocities, for example, led to the establish~ 
. ment of the Nuremberg tribunals, the evolution of the concepts of crimes 
against peace, crimes against humanity and the crime of genocide, the shaping 
of the Fourth Geneva Convention, and the birth of the human rights move~ 
ment. The starvation of Somali children prompted the Security Council to ap~ 
ply Chapter VII of the Charter to an essentially internal situation, bringing 
about a revolutionary change in our conception of the role of the Security 
Council to enforce peace in such situations. 
The Hague and Rwanda Tribunals 
Instant reporting from the field has resulted in rapid sensitization of public 
opinion, greatly reducing the time lapse between the perpetration of such trag~ 
edies and responses to them. It took the repeated and massive atrocities in the 
former Yugoslavia and then in Rwanda to persuade the Security Council to es~ 
tablish the two ad hoc criminal tribunals and to start the momentum towards 
the establishment of a standing international criminal court. The statutes of 
the ad hoc tribunals criminalized rape as a crime against humanity. At the same 
time, both the ICRC and the United States started interpreting the grave 
breaches provisions of the Geneva Conventions as encompassing rape. 
The Hague Tribunal has issued several important decisions that clarify and 
give judicial imprimatur to some rules of international humanitarian law. It has 
made a real contribution to the elucidation of crimes against humanity and to 
establishing that customary law war crimes apply also to non~international 
armed conflicts. Let us remember that as recently as 1949, the Geneva Con~ 
ventions contained only one article-common Article 3-which addressed 
non~international armed conflicts. Until the mid~90's, its violation was consid~ 
ered not to involve individual criminal responsibility. 
The Rwanda tribunal has issued important decisions on its competence and 
on genocide. The work of both tribunals demonstrates that international in~ 
vestigations and prosecutions of persons responsible for serious violations of in~ 
ternational humanitarian law are possible. These developments have created a 
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positive environment for the establishment of the standing international crimi~ 
nal court. 
Rome 
One is struck by three aspects of the scope of crimes under international hu~ 
manitat:ian law as it has emerged from the work of the diplomatic conference in 
Rome. First, most governments appeared ready to accept an expansive concep~ 
tion of customary international law without much supporting practice. Second 
is an increasing readiness to recognize that some rules of IHL once considered 
to involve only the responsibility of States may also be a basis for individual 
criminal responsibility. There are lessons to be learned here about the impact of 
public opinion on the formation of opinio juris and customary law. The ICRC 
study of customary rules ofIHL, now in progress, will further reinforce these de~ 
velopments. Third, the inclusion in the ICC Statute of common Article 3 and 
crimes against humanity, the latter divorced from a war nexus, connotes a cer~ 
tain blurring of IHL with human rights law and thus an incremental 
criminalization of serious violations of human rights. It goes without saying that 
the type of offenses encompassed by common Article 3 and crimes against hu~ 
manity are virtually indistinguishable from ordinary human rights violations. I 
note that we have witnessed a rapid transition of many principles and rules of 
IHL from the rhetorical to the normative, and from the merely normative to 
the effectively criminalized. 
These developments could not have taken place without a powerful new co~ 
alition driving the criminalization of offenses against the IHL. Much like the 
earlier coalition that stimulated the development of both a corpus of interna~ 
tional human rights law and the mechanisms involved in its enforcement, this 
new coalition includes scholars who promote and develop legal concepts and 
give them theoretical credibility, NGO's that provide public and political sup~ 
port and means of pressure, and various governments that spearhead 
law~making efforts in the United Nations. 
The adoption of the Rome Statute of the ICC on July 17,1998, is an event of 
major historical importance. Although it is still too early to assess the prospects 
of the effectiveness of the Court and many aspects of its Statute, this is not the 
case with regard to the definition of crimes against international humanitarian 
law contained in Articles 6-8. These articles, now part of treaty law, not only 
constitute the principal offenses that the ICC will try, but they will take on a 
life of their own as an authoritative and largely customary statement of interna~ 
tional humanitarian and criminal law. As such, they may become a model for 
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national laws to be enforced under the principle of universality of jurisdiction. 
They will thus have great influence on practice and doctrine even before the 
Statute enters into effect. 
Regarding the crime of genocide, the Statute tracks the 1948 Convention. 
The article defining crimes against humanity is the first multilateral treaty defi, 
nition of crimes against humanity. It is independent of any nexus with war. 
There are many additions to the Nuremberg list of crimes against humanity. 
Crimes ,added or developed include rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, 
forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any form of sexual violence of com' 
parable gravity. Rape and other sexual offences against women have been in, 
cluded in all of the sections of war crimes. 
For non,international armed conflicts, the Statute declares criminal serious 
violations of common Article 3 and also contains a significant list of 
Hague,type war crimes. This recognition of war crimes under customary law as 
pertinent to non,international armed conflicts represents a significant 
advance. 
The definitions of crimes are now in place. It is up to the States to make 
them effective, to punish violators and to deter future crimes. Recent atrocities 
in Kosovo should make us realize that adoption of treaties and statutes is not 
enough; without effective enforcement, prospects of deterrence will continue 
to be poor. 
Let me conclude with a broad reflection. We now have a system of Geneva 
Conventions that have obtained the formal assent of virtually all States. The 
Conventions give us exact language, and clarity, at least for the initiated. \Ve 
have created a complicated and technical system of humanitarian law that only 
experts can master. It is true that this system has not prevented the continuing 
growth of customary rules, to add, to modify, and to fill in the interstices of con, 
ventions. The jurisprudence of the Hague tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
provides a salutary example of this process. Although the teleological aspects of 
humanitarian law facilitate the continuing creation of customary law through 
emphasis on opinio juris, nonetheless, international humanitarian law is primar, 
ily conventional. 
A normative system, like chivalry, based largely on custom and a few rules of 
relative generality, would not suffice in the face of the frequent disintegration 
of States, the multiplicity of powerful actors on the domestic and international 
scene, and the modern weapons and technology. However, through this pro' 
cess 'of treaty,making, of codification, vital and necessary as it is, we may have 
lost the sense that rules arise naturally out of societies. We may have lost the 
flexibility that came from rules of essentially customary character. And finally, 
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we may have forgotten the value attaching to honour, chivalry and mercy. In 
conflicts around the world, people not only kill and rape, they are proud of their 
deeds. 
We must revive our ability to feel shame and guilt. We have to create a cul~ 
ture of individual responsibility. Utopian attempts to revive chivalry would 
have little effect. But, to make international humanitarian law truly effective, 
we need to reinvigorate chivalry's culture of values, especially the notion of in~ 
dividual honour and dishonour as motivating factors for the conduct of both 
warriors and citizens. Treaties alone will not ensure respect for fundamental 
norms. 
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